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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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                      Appellants 
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JENNIFER VELEZ, Esq., In her official capacity as Commissioner;  
ANCORA PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL; ALLAN BOYER, Individually, and in his 
official capacity as Director, Human Resources; ALFRED FILIPPINI, Individually, and 
in his official capacity as Director, Human Resources 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-11-cv-01856) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 June 24, 2014 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 






NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
I. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Weisman is a registered nurse.  She was employed as a charge nurse at Ancora 
Psychiatric Hospital from 1998 until 2010.  Weisman took a medical leave of absence 
from Ancora in late September, 2008, due to a diagnosed panic disorder.  In June of 
2009, as her medical leave neared an end, Ancora officials notified Weisman that she 
needed to secure her physician’s approval before returning to work.  She would also have 
to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation by a psychiatrist.  Although she was cleared for 
duty by her doctor, Weisman was deemed unfit to return to work by the examining 
psychiatrist.  Ancora informed Weisman that she was suspended pending the termination 
of her employment.  Pursuant to New Jersey law, hospital officials also notified the New 
Jersey Board of Nursing that Weisman’s privileges had been suspended.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 26:2H-12.2b(a)(1)(a).  The hospital officially terminated her employment in 
January of 2010 and Ancora also informed the Board of Nursing of Weisman’s 
termination. 
 Weisman’s union appealed the termination and the parties proceeded to 
arbitration.  In August of 2010, the parties entered into a settlement agreement.  The 
terms were simple:  Weisman agreed to waive all claims arising from her employment 
with Ancora and in return, the hospital agreed to designate her departure as one based on 
a “resignation in good standing” instead of the more punitive designation of “removal.”  
An error on the final Notice of Disciplinary Action indicated that her resignation was 
“not in good standing,” but this error was later corrected by the hospital.  A month after 
resigning from Ancora, Weisman interviewed at another hospital, Kennedy Memorial, 
and she was offered a position there, conditioned on a satisfactory background check.  
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Kennedy Memorial hired an investigatory firm, which in turn sent Ancora a 
questionnaire, seeking a reference for Weisman.  Ancora reported that Weisman had 
resigned voluntarily from her position and that her job performance met Ancora’s 
standards for patient care.  However, in response to the question whether Ancora had ever 
reported Weisman to a professional review board, Ancora responded that it had, attaching 
copies of its letters to the New Jersey Board of Nursing.  Kennedy Memorial 
subsequently withdrew its offer of employment. 
 Weisman blamed Ancora for the withdrawal of Kennedy Memorial’s employment 
offer, and filed an action against the hospital in the District Court under various federal 
statutes, seeking back pay, damages, and injunctive relief.  She also asked for equitable 
relief from the District Court to address Ancora’s alleged failure to properly implement 
the provisions of the settlement agreement.  After the District Court denied motions to 
dismiss, and discovery had concluded, both parties filed for summary judgment.  
Weisman asked for partial summary judgment on her state-law breach of contract claim; 
Ancora sought relief on all counts.  The District Court denied Weisman’s motion and 
granted summary judgment to Ancora on all counts.  Weisman timely appealed and we 
will affirm. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo and “view inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 
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243, 248 (3d Cir. 2010) quoting Bayer v. Monroe Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 
186, 192 (3d Cir. 2009).  “Summary judgment is appropriate where the [c]ourt is satisfied 
‘that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 
(1986).   
III. 
 As the District Court did, we begin our analysis with the parties’ settlement 
agreement.  There can be no dispute that the settlement agreement is a valid, bargained-
for exchange between Weisman and Ancora.  The agreement originally noted that 
Weisman’s penalty was one of “removal.”  But, handwritten notations indicated Ancora’s 
agreement to modify that penalty to a “resignation in good standing.”  Weisman, for her 
part, agreed to waive “all appeals, claims, demands, damages, causes of actions or suits,” 
which she might bring against “the state, its employees, agents, or assigns arising out of 
or relate to the subject matter of this disciplinary action . . .  .”  The gist of Weisman’s 
case, before the District Court and on appeal, is her belief that by agreeing to characterize 
her departure as a “resignation in good standing,” Ancora also agreed not to divulge its 
negative reports to the Board of Nursing to any prospective future employer.  Ancora 
agreed to do nothing of the sort, and we find all of Weisman’s claims meritless.   
A. 
 Weisman first argues that the District Court erroneously interpreted the provisions 
of her settlement agreement with Ancora.  Focusing on the Amended Final Notice of 
Disciplinary Action (which mistakenly stated that Weisman’s resignation was “not” in 
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good standing), Weisman argues that the District Court erred by construing Ancora’s 
responsibilities solely to the correction of this error.  Her larger point is that by agreeing 
to change her departure designation to a resignation in good standing, Ancora agreed to 
either rescind its negative reports to the Board of Nursing or to omit any reference to 
those reports when queried by prospective employers.  We reject Weisman’s contentions. 
 The District Court did not construe the settlement agreement as narrowly as 
Weisman suggests.  Ancora’s responsibility under the settlement agreement, as the 
District Court correctly noted, was to record that Weisman resigned her position “in good 
standing.”  Ancora met that responsibility.  In response to Kennedy Memorial’s 
background investigation, Ancora indicated that Weisman voluntarily resigned her 
employment with the hospital.  Weisman’s argument that the initial error on her 
termination notice was a breach of the settlement agreement is equally as unavailing.  
While the error may have violated the terms of the agreement, the violation was not a 
material one.  As we see it, Ancora’s obligation under the settlement agreement was to 
report to any interested future employer that Weisman resigned her employment “in good 
standing” with the hospital.  The fact that her initial termination notice mistakenly 
indicated that she had not left in good standing is irrelevant because Ancora never sent 
the flawed notice to any future employment prospect.   
 Further, nothing in the settlement reveals Ancora’s agreement to revoke its letters 
to the Board of Nursing, or to omit reference to them upon any inquiry by a prospective 
employer of Weisman.  Nor could Ancora bargain away this statutory obligation.  See 
N.J.  Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-12.2b(a)(1)(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. 26:2H-12.2c(a)(2).  Weisman 
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additionally maintains that the parties actually agreed that the disclosure of Ancora’s 
reports to the Board of Nursing would violate the settlement agreement and that the 
District Court overlooked testimony in support of this contention.  That is not so.  
Weisman points to testimony of Ancora CEO Boyer in support of her claim.  When asked 
whether a negative reference by Ancora would be consistent with Weisman’s resignation 
“in good standing,” CEO Boyer indicated that such a conclusion was “not in the 
agreement.”  Further, Boyer did not testify that the designation “in good standing” left 
Weisman with a clean employment record, as she asserts on appeal.  To the contrary, 
Boyer never made such a pronouncement; indeed, he was never asked whether 
Weisman’s resignation exempted the hospital from its statutory obligations.   
 Lastly, the record repudiates Weisman’s argument that the settlement agreement 
was a contract of adhesion.  There simply is no evidence that Weisman was confused or 
dissatisfied with the agreement’s terms.  Nor can we find any evidence of duress or fraud 
that would lead us to a conclusion that the settlement negotiations were unfairly one-
sided. 
B. 
 Next, Weisman argues that the District Court erred by dismissing her retaliation 
claim.  Weisman also maintains that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to 
rescind the agreement.  We disagree on both points.  As to the retaliation claim, which 
Weisman brought under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, and the 
First Amendment to the Constitution, we find those claims waived.  The settlement 
agreement specifically waives any claims brought by Weisman under the CEPA and 42 
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U.S.C. § 1983.  Having previously found the agreement to be a valid  one, we hold 
Weisman to its terms.1  
 Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by refusing to rescind the settlement 
agreement.  Weisman argues that the agreement should be rescinded because she was 
unaware that Ancora had reported her to the Board of Nursing.  We first note that a 
“unilateral mistake of a fact unknown to the other party is not ordinarily grounds for 
avoidance of a contract,” and that, in order to grant rescission in the case of a factual 
mistake, “the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable care 
by the party making the mistake.”  Intertech Assocs., Inc. v. City of Paterson, 604 A.2d 
628, 632 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).  Here, we agree with the District Court that 
Weisman presented no evidence to support her claim that she did not know that Ancora 
had reported her to the Board of Nursing.  Now, with the benefit of hindsight, Weisman 
argues that she agreed to the “in good standing” designation but thought that by so doing, 
Ancora would be obligated to rescind its letters to the Board of Nursing.  She claims that 
the hospital did not notify her that they had reported her to the Board of Nursing before 
she signed the settlement agreement and that she would not have done so had she known 
of the reports.  The record, however, tells a different story.  Weisman, in fact, signed a 
                                              
1 Weisman also argues that even if the waiver provision is enforceable, Weisman’s 
retaliation claim stemming from Ancora’s June 2010 disclosure of the reports to the 
Board of Nursing is still viable because this claim arose after the Settlement Agreement 
was signed, and the waiver provision only bars claims that accrued before the parties 
entered the agreement.  This claim is also without merit because it is predicated on the 
incorrect assumption that such disclosure violated Ancora’s obligations under the 
agreement. We have already decided that this disclosure did not violate the Settlement 
Agreement and was, in fact, legally required.  Any retaliation claim based on this 
disclosure must fail. 
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mail receipt on April 2, 2010, just two days after Ancora had sent her a letter enclosing 
the two reports it had made to the Board of Nursing.  Further, Weisman herself 
acknowledged that she did indeed have notice of the hospital’s reports---she specifically 
stated so in her complaint.  Therefore, the District Court did not err by finding that 
Weisman’s own failure to exercise reasonable care by reviewing her own mail precludes 
rescission of the agreement.2 
C. 
 Weisman also maintains that the District Court incorrectly resolved several issues 
of material fact.  We disagree and will briefly review Weisman’s arguments.  To begin 
with, Weisman argues that the District Court improperly resolved the question of when 
she received notice that Ancora had reported her to the Board of Nursing.  We have 
already disposed of this argument.  To be plain, the record specifically contradicts 
Weisman’s position that she received no notice of Ancora’s reports before starting 
arbitration.  The District Court committed no error.  Weisman points to further instances 
where she believes the District Court improperly resolved issues of material fact.  These 
include her assertion that there was no “meeting of the minds” on essential terms of the 
settlement agreement; that the District Court’s construction of the term “resignation in 
good standing” is inconsistent with the intent of the parties; that Ancora’s disciplinary 
actions against her lacked predicate facts; whether she truly was unfit for duty as 
determined by Dr. Margolis, the examining psychiatrist; whether Dr. Margolis’ report 
                                              
2 Our review of the record convinces us that any allegation of fraud made by Weisman 
must fail as well.  As the District Court correctly noted,  the record reveals no allegations 
of fraud, duress or any other imposition  that might have negated the agreement.   
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was based on accurate information; and whether Weisman undertook actions (leaving 
voicemail messages, etc.) and whether those actions were inappropriate or disrespectful.  
We reject all of these contentions. 
 First of all, these alleged “genuine issues of material fact” all transpired before the 
creation of the settlement agreement on April 16, 2010.  Since the District Court 
concluded that Ancora had not breached the Settlement Agreement, the agreement’s 
waiver proviso bars claims arising before April 16, 2010.  Moreover, the District Court 
did not base its opinion on these alleged factual disputes, but instead provided Weisman’s 
counsel with generous opportunities to rebut Dr. Margolis’ evaluation of her fitness for 
duty.  The bottom line here is that the District Judge did not resolve disputed issues of 
fact but instead relied on undisputed facts in resolving this case.  These undisputed facts 
included Weisman’s own admissions of her conduct; conduct which provided the basis 
for Ancora’s report to the Board of Nursing.  We, therefore, find no error on the part of 
the District Court. 
D. 
 Weisman lastly contends that the District Court erred by denying her motion for 
partial summary judgment as moot.  Specifically, she believes the District Court should 
have granted her partial summary judgment on Ancora’s affirmative defense that New 
Jersey law required them to report Weisman to the Board of Nursing.  We see no error in 
the District Court’s decision to deny her motion.  Weisman’s argument on appeal suffers 
from a lack of supporting evidence.  She points to no evidence that Ancora could have 
legally concealed its reports from the Board of Nursing or that they could have omitted 
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notifying Kennedy Memorial without violating New Jersey law.  Indeed, Weisman 
concedes this point. 
 In short, Weisman has not demonstrated an entitlement to summary judgment---
partial or otherwise--- on her breach of contract claim or on Ancora’s affirmative defense 
of statutory compliance. 
IV. 
 In sum, and having considered all arguments raised by the Appellant, we find no 
merit to them and will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
